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Reading resistances in Ralph Waldo Emerson and José Martí 
 
 
Abstract: 
This essay takes as its starting point a consideration of the ways in which the ideological methodology 
“New Americanist” criticism has closed off possibilities of reading that might choose to value ambiguity, 
contradiction, and excess – elements which militate against the discursive neatness of critique. In readings 
of Ralph Waldo Emerson and Jose Martí, I argue that resolutely politicised interpretations of Emerson 
fail to do justice to the unstable texture of his prose. In turn, Martí’s writing about the United States is 
more uneven, surreal and excessive than a straightforward account of postcolonial resistance allows. Both 
Emerson and Martí exhibit a discursive flexibility that puts pressure on readings driven by inflexible 
ideological parameters seeking to position both men within frameworks of political quietism and 
postcolonial revolution respectively. I explore how the idea of revolution is imagined by Emerson in ways 
that run counter to our more conventional understanding of political transformation. To be sure, Martí’s 
revolutionary actions in the cause of Cuban independence were tangible in ways that Emerson could 
never have countenanced for himself; nevertheless Emerson’s understanding of resistance as differently 
located and performed provoked in Martí a high, and consistent, degree of sympathy. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
“[Y]ou lose yourself in the wonder of what becomes, as it were, of the obstinate, the unconverted 
residuum” – Henry James, The American Scene (1907) 
“Sus libros son sumas, no demostraciones” – José Martí, “Emerson” (1882) 
“There is always a residuum unknown, unanalyzable” – Ralph Waldo Emerson, “Circles” (1841) 
 
When Henry James visited “fantastic Florida” in 1905, as part of his travels around the United States that 
would come to be recorded in The American Scene (1907), he was struck by the sheer diversity of what he 
observed. The “rank vegetation” and “warm, heroic, amorous air”1 seemed to encourage a concentration 
of human habitation that paid scant respect for the principles of order and proportion that he had noted, 
and remembered from his childhood, in New England. Palm Beach, he judged, was “as nowhere else, in 
America”, for here “one would find Vanity Fair in full blast – and Vanity Fair not scattered, not 
discriminated and parcelled out, as among the comparative practices and ancientries of Newport, but 
compressed under one vast cover, enclosed in a single huge vitrine, which there would be nothing to 
prevent one’s flattening one’s nose against for days of delight” (330). The feeling of fascination and 
exclusion that is articulated here is built around its author’s sense of estrangement from an American 
geography that fails to conform to a topographic imagination of clear divisions and boundaries. Florida’s 
investment in a commercial scene, a hotel culture in which, for James, enclosure had failed to generate a 
sense of discrimination, stands in marked contrast to an earlier moment of imaginative mapping during 
his American travels. While visiting the College Yard at Harvard, somewhere very familiar to James from 
his childhood living in Cambridge and his aborted studies at the university, the returning expatriate drew 
attention to the ways in which topography might work to create interpretative stability and the articulation 
of codes. The “drawing of the belt at Harvard”, he writes, “is an admirably interesting example of the way 
in which the formal enclosure of objects at all interesting immediately refines upon their interest, 
immediately establishes values” (49). The vocabulary here is characteristically Jamesian, of course, in its 
insistence on refinement as a practice of social reading, where the resulting precision of “interest” allows 
for the establishment of criteria for judgement, of “values”. 
What is intriguing about this moment of stability in James’s visit is precisely its precariousness in 
the larger narrative of which it is a part, for The American Scene is preoccupied with moments of resistance 
to enclosure, in which the imperative to contain and describe is continually thwarted by a visual scene that 
eludes coherence and a language that struggles to represent. Harvard offers respite from a re-encountered 
space that seems to exceed the organising structures of observation and grammar, for elsewhere the 
discursive ambition to describe and represent finds itself continually outflanked by uncanny traces or 
incursions that unsettle authorial control. The American Scene is a performance of creative tension, in which 
the impulse to define finds itself thwarted by the failure to contain experience. As Paul Giles has noted, 
the text “throws an extended question mark over [the] historical dimensions of the American scene, 
representing as it does a fluid, inchoate world that cannot readily be subsumed into any preexisting 
American ‘type’”.2 Florida’s modernity, its participation in the establishment of a national character “all 
yet to be made”, is at the same time haunted by ghosts of its Spanish past. At the coastal city of St. 
Augustine James marvels at the imitation Ponce de Leon Hotel, built in 1888 in Spanish Colonial Revival 
style by the co-founder of Standard Oil Henry Flagler. The building, he writes, “comes as near producing, 
all by itself, the illusion of romance as a highly modern, a most cleverly-constructed and smoothly-
administered great modern caravansery can come”. “[I]t breaks out on every pretext, into circular arches 
and embroidered screens, into courts and cloisters, arcades and fountains, fantastic projections and lordly 
towers”. If this example of simulated colonial history caters to James’s leisured observer status, his visit to 
“the old Spanish fort”, a “mild, time-silvered quadrilateral”, “preserves alone … the memory of the 
Spanish occupation” (338), a ghostly American past that sits alongside its faux present (and future). If the 
United States was, for James, a “vast uncomfortable subject”,3 part of that discomfort could be found in 
its palimpsestic layering of different chronologies and histories, such that the observing consciousness 
fails to maintain a satisfactory epistemological mastery.4 
Elsewhere in The American Scene James notes that “the further one wandered the more the 
suggestion spoke”: 
 
The sense of the size of the Margin, that was the name of it – the Margin by which the total of 
American life, huge as it already appears, is still so surrounded as to represent, for the mind’s eye 
on a general view, but a scant flotilla huddled as for very fear of the fathomless depth of water, the 
too formidable future, on the so much vaster lake of the materially possible. Once that torch is at 
all vividly lighted it flares, for any pair of open eyes, over every scene, and with a presence that 
helps to explain the owner’s veritable failure to conclude. (295) 
 
The known United States, already acute in its epistemological challenges, is depicted as being surrounded 
by spatial excess (a “fathomless depth”, a “so much vaster lake”) and temporal exaggeration (a “too 
formidable future”), such that orderly mapping is impossible. The “torch” of observation confirms 
James’s inability to control the representational task, for “the owner’s veritable failure to conclude” marks 
the illusoriness of definitive statement. The “Margin” of the American scene, then, is characterised by 
accompanying, and potentially overwhelming, aporia, in which apparent stabilities are traversed by 
omissions, elaborations or absences. Textual surfaces, under these conditions, become spaces of striving 
and contestation, where definition is felt to be elusive, in turn generating further efforts to approach 
precision. As Ross Posnock has suggested, “By refusing to resolve paradoxes or dissolve difference into 
identity, Henry James avoids submitting to an ideology of harmonious totality, be it organic form or what 
he calls progressivism’s ‘American identity’”.5 
Henry James’s awareness of the layered complexities of the national space, and the kinds of 
epistemological dispersals that these might generate, challenges readings of American literature that seek 
to root out either ideological complicity or consistency within literary texts. This essay seeks to explore 
the limitations of such readings for two writers for whom the Jamesian “gap” is a feature of their 
aesthetic and political projects, Ralph Waldo Emerson and the expatriate Cuban writer and revolutionary 
José Martí. Martí was an avid reader of Emerson, writing a powerful encomium for him in 1882. Like 
James, he occupied a tense, unresolvable position in relation to the United States, despite living in exile in 
New York from 1881 to 1895. Maria del Pilar Blanco, one of the few critics to consider James and Martí 
together, has noted how both writers stand “at a crossroads or on boundaries between national territories, 
genres, literary movements, and aesthetic tendencies”.6 In “Our America” (“Nuestra América”, 1891), 
Marti’s most famous articulation of Latin American identity and its complex relationship to North 
America, he writes against the notion of “America” as something organic and inevitably progressive. 
Instead it is disjointed and fragmentary, composed of the collision of apparently incompatible elements: 
“We were a phenomenon with the chest of an athlete, the hands of a dandy, and the brain of a child. We 
were a masquerader in English breeches, Parisian vest, North American jacket, and a Spanish cap.”7 This 
American body is, as Julio Ramos has noted, “[c]onstructed with the remains of codes, incongruent 
fragments of conflicting traditions, … the product of historical violence”.8 Far from ideologically 
harmonious, the condition of American identity cannot be embodied, or textually represented, without an 
awareness of these divergences in which meaning is dispersed across paragraphs where a rhetoric of 
excess is fundamental to their structuring. For del Pilar Blanco, “Martí and James comment on the U.S. 
landscapes before them, neither of them feeling as insiders would within the spaces that they represent on 
the page”.9  
In contrast Emerson’s New England heritage marks him, geographically, as central to a dominant 
strand of the national imaginary. Yet both Emerson and Martí exhibit a discursive flexibility that puts 
pressure on readings driven by inflexible ideological parameters seeking to position them within 
frameworks of political quietism and postcolonial revolution respectively. A provocation for my argument 
has been the work of Laura Lomas, whose account of Martí and, in turn, of Martí’s reading of Emerson, 
has sought to position the Cuban writer as offering an insistent critique of Emerson’s usefulness as a 
political model. Lomas argues that, “[a]gainst a common misreading of Martí as an uncritical celebrant of 
Euro-American modernity and technique”,10 the Cuban writer is located within a postcolonial in-
betweenness, in which he “adopted tactics of subterfuge in his criticism and translation because of his 
formative experiences as a deportee, a political prisoner, and a migrant in an emergent empire” (41). The 
critical assumptions at work here depend upon an acceptance of Lomas’s characterisation of the 
“common misreading” that is her originating premise. In fact, Martí’s work has most usefully been 
understood as an often complex dialectic of imperial celebration and critique, an unsettled and unsettling 
discursive style that underscores the in-betweenness of Lomas’s formulation. Her reading of Martí’s 
Emerson is designed to support a view of the Cuban’s increasing political activism in the 1880s, one in 
which “the emerging canon of North American writing lacked the perspective that would permit 
understanding of postcolonial conditions in his [Martí’s] America” (132). To do this, Lomas holds 
Emerson to account for his interpellation of US imperialist culture and proposes that Martí is able to see 
through the political limitations of such a position to a point at which Emerson’s intellectual legacy can 
be rejected. Essentially Martí is asked to perform a New Americanist reading of Emerson avant la lettre, 
one in which a practice of ideological critique is deployed to shore up a progressive politics. The difficulty 
with such an approach, I want to suggest, is that it has the effect of simplifying the complex radicalism of 
Emerson’s career at the same time as it wants to insist on that complexity for Martí.11  My intention is to 
explore how the idea of revolution is imagined by Emerson in ways that, at times, seemingly run counter 
to our more conventional understanding of political upheaval and transformation. To be sure, Martí’s 
revolutionary actions in the cause of Cuban independence were tangible in ways that Emerson could 
never have countenanced for himself; yet Emerson’s understanding of resistance as differently located 
and exhibited provoked in Martí a high, and consistent, degree of sympathy. Through readings of, 
amongst other texts, his tribute to Emerson and his impressions of a US leisure class at play on Coney 
Island, I show how a principle of discursive openness creates narrative complexity, a restless “residuum,” 
that militates against the neat positioning of ideological critique.        
 
A method of misreading 
 
Donald Pease, a key voice in revisionary readings of American literature under the banner of “New 
Americanism”, has argued for a literary criticism that pays closer attention to the ideological complicity of 
texts, their (maybe hidden) investment in structures of power that masquerade as shibboleths of New 
World exceptionalism. For the New Americanists, transforming the field of American Studies entailed 
sceptically redescribing the critical founding figures of the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s (F.O. Matthiessen, Leo 
Marx, Henry Nash Smith, Richard Poirier and others) so as to mark a decisive break that would enable 
the field to constitute itself, politically, anew. The failure of these earlier writers, according to the new 
scholarship, lay in their abandonment of the social or the political in favour of the aesthetic, an aesthetic 
specifically defined by its interest in subjective interiority, so that an idea of consciousness replaced 
economic and political systems as the most meaningful reality. As such, these earlier writers upheld a 
tradition of the American romance: the literary text as a transcendent “world elsewhere” in which the 
desire for organic wholeness might be fulfilled. 
 This critical paradigm shift was, in many ways, a necessary one, and one whose effects continue 
to guide the discipline today. The exceptionalist criteria of the “myth and symbol” school – its adherence 
to the rhetorical shorthand of the American Adam, of manifest destiny, of the virgin land – were exposed 
usefully as a “disciplinary unconscious” blind to the political repressions that had enabled their aesthetic 
coherence. Pease’s vocabulary, as Johannes Voelz has noted, is drawn from psychoanalysis and Marxist 
readings of Freud, asserting the inevitability of a work’s location in a “field-Imaginary” and its articulation 
of a “disciplinary unconscious”. Pease writes: 
 
By the term field-Imaginary I mean to designate a location for the disciplinary unconscious… Here 
abides the field’s fundamental syntax – its tacit assumptions, convictions, primal words, and the 
charged relations binding them together… Once constructed out of this syntax, the primal identity 
can neither reflect upon its terms nor subject them to critical scrutiny. The syntactic elements of 
the field-Imaginary subsist instead as self-evident principles.12 
 
Voelz points out that Pease’s position is built on the premise that belonging to a field-Imaginary “requires 
the practitioner’s identification with an established representation of the field” along with “the repression 
of all that contradicts the identification”.13 It became a feature of this critical approach that canonical 
authors were deemed to have fallen short, politically, of the liberal, progressive standards against which 
they were judged. The risk with this kind of reading was that it appeared to shore up a self-congratulatory 
narrative of progress towards our own present moment of apparently enlightened politics; it was difficult 
to conceptualise how writers who were inevitably drenched in ideology could nevertheless formulate 
positions that allowed for dissent or resistance, however precariously or fleetingly. At times, New 
Americanist criticism tended to flatten or homogenise authors, in the service of demonstrating a political 
advocacy, so that tensions and contradictions that might be intrinsic to their textual worlds were often 
overlooked. 
 Emerson has found himself the focus of this kind of politicised approach, most polemically 
perhaps in a strong reading by John Carlos Rowe in his 1997 study At Emerson’s Tomb. Writing against a 
tradition that had elevated Emerson as the archetypal figure of nineteenth-century exceptionalism, as an 
avatar of non-conformity, Rowe argues that Emerson’s abolitionist credentials are undermined through a 
transcendentalist aesthetic that is unable to commit to tangible politics. Emerson’s shifting perspectives 
and claims are reduced to instances of ideological obfuscation that end up endorsing the political 
conditions he is ostensibly attacking, a state of affairs that is contagious for an entire tradition of 
American writing. “In short,” Rowe writes, “the classic American literature founded on Emersonian 
values would be an explicit instance of an ‘aesthetic ideology’ working to support the very social forces it 
overtly criticizes”.14 As Voelz notes, interpellation of this kind “seems almost entirely to predetermine the 
ideological import of a given author’s or tradition’s texts”,15 thereby closing down the possibility of a 
text’s value beyond the instrumentally political. Althusserian interpellation “does not let him [Rowe] look 
at what else these texts – and, in fact, representation in general – may be doing”.16 It is the “what else” 
that also interests Rita Felski, who, in a sophisticated dissection of our critical impulse that insists on its 
ability and authority to read through the apparent surface assertions of texts, laments the current 
imperative within the discipline to resort to what Paul Ricoeur calls a “hermeneutics of suspicion”. Why, 
she asks, are critics so motivated “to interrogate, unmask, expose, subvert, unravel, demystify, destabilize, 
take issue, and take umbrage”?17 Critique of this kind generates a state of affairs in which “scholars in the 
humanities are far more fluent in nay-saying than in yay-saying, and that eternal vigilance, unchecked by 
alternatives, can easily lapse into the complacent cadences of autopilot argument”.18 While acknowledging 
the importance of uncovering the often occluded ideological premises that may structure a text, I’m more 
interested here in exploring how Emerson’s writing pushes against the efforts of analysis to locate him 
within a too narrowly-defined discursive position. Ideological critique can only go so far in taking the 
measure of Emerson’s meaning without distorting the inherent mobility of his words. Sharon Cameron, 
whose on work on Emerson has paid close attention to his shifting moods, offers an understanding of 
Henry James’s writing that speaks to the kind of restless particularisation that is at stake here, and which 
characterises Emerson’s response to revolution and, in turn, José Martí’s reading of Emerson and of 
America’s revolutionary history. “Conflicts”, Cameron writes, “become occasions for consciousness to 
proliferate, as in a dialogue which would keep going, or keep exchanging, not so much viewpoints held by 
consciousness as, more simply still, diverse manifestations of it”.19 Rather than flattening difference into 
false unity, this kind of discursive consciousness proliferates endlessly, testing ideas, allowing viewpoints 
to jostle against each other, expanding, revising and moderating as thought is given textual shape. 
 In “The Method of Nature”, a lecture first delivered in 1841 before the Society of the Adelphi in 
Waterville College, Maine, Emerson asserted the “perpetual inchoation” of nature, to the extent that it 
posed real challenges to our attempts at hermeneutic containment. “[W]ho could ever analyse it?” he asks. 
“That rushing stream will not stop to be observed. We can never surprise nature in a corner; never find 
the end of a thread…Every natural fact is an emanation, and that from which it emanates is an emanation 
also, and from every emanation is a new emanation”. In the face of such proliferation, fixity becomes 
dangerously self-defeating, as Emerson draws an analogy with a mind unbalanced by rigidity: “If anything 
could stand still, it would be crushed and dissipated by the torrent it resisted, and it if it were a mind, 
would be crazed; as insane persons are those who hold fast to one thought, and do not flow with the 
course of nature”.20 Entrapment by institutional and discursive frameworks, those “dead forms of our 
forefathers,”21 posed challenges for Emerson from as early as his first employment (between 1829 and 
1832) as a Unitarian minister, in which theological doctrine and the formal constraints of preaching 
increasingly came to be experienced as impediments to transformative thought, what Posnock describes 
as “finding ways to write and speak sentences that approximate the volatility that marks nature and 
human being”.22 “Preaching is a pledge”, Emerson confides to his journal in 1838 after attending an 
uninspiring convention of New England educators, “& I wish to say what I think & feel today with the 
proviso that tomorrow perhaps I shall contradict it all. Freedom boundless I wish” (JMN 7:239). “We are 
shut up in schools & college recitation rooms for ten or fifteen years & come out at last with a bellyful of 
words & do not know a thing”, he laments (JMN 7:238). Instead Emerson’s writing seeks to perform a 
self-reflexive embodiment of the oscillations of thought, of the ways in which words might be deployed 
in the service of approaching the often complex contortions of life. This idea is perhaps seen in its most 
acute form in “Nominalist and Realist”, a largely neglected essay published in 1844 in Essays: Second Series 
which grapples with the competing demands of abstract knowledge and actual experience, as Emerson 
weighs up the relationship between these different epistemological vantage points: 
  Nature will not be Buddhist: she resents generalizing, and insults the philosopher in every 
moment with a million fresh particulars. It is all idle talking: as much as a man is a whole, so is he 
also a part; and it were partial not to see it. What you say in your pompous distribution only 
distributes you into your class and section. You have not got rid of parts by denying them, but are 
the more partial. You are one thing, but Nature is one thing and the other thing, in the same moment. 
(CWE 3:236) 
 
The oscillation between the individual and the universal, between actual and theoretical perspectives, is 
indicative of the often tense and unresolved shape of the essay as the whole. As David Robinson has 
noted, it is a dilemma that “prevents any definitive – and static – conception of the human estate”,23 with 
the check on generalisation offered through the maintenance of opposite and diverse particularities that 
unravel our desire for a transcendent, unified view. Emerson’s prose, then, performs the difficult task of 
holding oppositions in play. “No sentence will hold the whole truth,” he insists, “and the only way in 
which we can be just, is by giving ourselves the lie; Speech is better than silence; silence is better than 
speech; – All things are in contact; every atom as a sphere of repulsion; – Things are, and are not, at the 
same time; – and the like” (CWE 3:245). Syntactically these lines refuse the assurances of a settled view, 
propelled through the choice of their punctuation to assert alternative and contradictory statements that 
undermine resolution: “– and the like” keeps things deliberately open, as Posnock notes, “[a] stubborn 
testimony of the inextinguishable remainder” that cannot be contained linguistically or discursively.24 
Our need for explanation, for the identification of origins and final destinations as conceptual 
frameworks of reassurance, is nevertheless strong. In “Experience”, the most celebrated essay in the 
Second Series volume, Emerson is prepared to acknowledge the possibility that, despite a belief that life is a 
“flux of moods”, there is “that in us which changes not and which ranks all sensations and states of 
mind”, a “First Cause” which organises and structures experience. He goes on to rehearse some of the 
names that are attached to this stabilising force – “Fortune, Minerva, Muse, Holy Ghost” – before 
deciding that “these are quaint names, too narrow to cover this unbounded substance” (CWE 3:72). By 
exalting “Chance into a divinity”, Emerson insists, we “stay too long at the spark” (CWE 3:70). The 
spontaneity and evanescence of a spark – an image to which I will return shortly – is transformed into 
something causal and reductive. Indeed causality and “casual” are established in “Experience” as 
homophonic opposites, with the explanatory structure of the former countered by Emerson’s embrace of 
uncertainty: “We thrive by casualties. Our chief experiences have been casual”, for “In the thought of 
genius there is always a surprise” (CWE 3:68). By recognising the “evanescence and lubricity of all 
objects” (CWE 3:49), Emerson rejects the requirement to lay claim to an organising principle or a 
foundational position, one which, he suggests, is overwhelmed by the “uncalculated and uncalculable” 
(CWE 3:69) unpredictability of experience. In a daring move that threatens to undermine his (self-) image 
as public thinker, he turns away from the usefulness of theorisation as a discursive practice altogether: 
 
But what help from these fineries or pedantries? What help from thought? Life is not dialectics. 
We, I think, in these times, have had lessons enough of the futility of criticism. Our young people 
have thought and written much on labor and reform, and for all that they have written, neither the 
world nor themselves have got on a step. Intellectual tasting of life will not supersede muscular 
activity … Objections and criticism we have had our fill of. There are objections to every course of 
life and action, and the practical wisdom infers an indifferency, from the omnipresence of 
objection… Life is not intellectual or critical, but sturdy. (CWE 3:58, 59) 
 
Intellectual work, by this reckoning, solidifies into ineffective rhetoric in which theorisations about the 
issues of the moment can make no tangible impact upon them. “Muscular activity”, the specificity of 
doing, with all its risks of divergence and of failure acknowledged, is pitted against the dilettantish 
“[i]ntellectual tasting”. Emerson’s preference lies in the particulars of action, in an engagement with 
complex shapes of experience rather than the neat “dialectics” of theory. Only in this way can we be 
reconciled to a world in which, as he claims in “Circles” (1841), “[e]very ultimate fact is only the first of a 
new series. Every general law only a particular fact of some general law presently to disclose itself” (CWE 
2:304); “All that we reckoned settled shakes and rattles; and literature, cities, climates, religions, leave their 
foundations and dance before our eyes” (CWE 2:311). 
 What Emerson describes here is nothing less than a method of reading, one which proposes a 
stance of radical openness and provisionality that, while not relinquishing the responsibility of ethical or 
political response, is alive to the dangers of allowing these to ossify into what William James would later 
characterise (in “Pragmatism”) as a “refined object of contemplation” that overlooks the “colossal 
universe of concrete facts, … their awful bewilderments, their surprises and cruelties, … the wildness 
which they show”.25 Emerson’s political credentials need to be read then in the context of this calibration, 
in which revolution might be understood as a series of eruptions or surprises which provoke possibilities 
of transformation that disrupt our categories of classification. Instead of what, in “Circles”, he 
characterises as “rest, conservatism, appropriation, inertia; not newness, not the way onward” (CWE 
2:319), Emerson’s hermeneutical theory depends upon an anti-theoretical commitment to what Jeffrey 
Insko describes as “the joys of unknowing” which routinely exert pressure upon our conventional desire 
to enact neat causal and conceptual structures.26 If Emerson’s understanding of how we interact with the 
world about us is indeed characterised through moments of such singular intensity, our view of his 
revolutionary credentials needs to acknowledge the potential political effectiveness of this strategy. 
 
Reading revolutions 
 
Despite Emerson’s later rejection of the heroic as model for revolutionary change, an earlier lecture series 
on Biography (delivered in 1835) saw him grappling with the usefulness of the Great Man as a subject of 
scrutiny. In the lecture on Martin Luther, he charts in part a genealogy of antinomian resistance, what 
Kenyon Gradert calls “an historical logic of Protestant dissent running from the Reformation through the 
English Civil War into the present”, “a common antinomian militancy”.27 Emerson declares of Luther: 
“He achieved a spiritual revolution by spiritual arms alone. … He had such an unbounded confidence in 
the might of spiritual weapons that he would not degrade his cause by calling in the aid of flesh and 
blood. He believed a single truth was of strength to put to flight all the armies, all the kingdoms of the 
world”.28 The military lexicon continues for Luther “was summoned by God to set up a standard for 
Reform, and to do battle with the infernal hosts” (136); he “was a fountain of strength, and resembled the 
torpedo which from the inexhaustible electricity within it affords an unceasing artillery of new shocks, 
each more violent than the last” (141). Clearly Emerson’s thought at this early point in his career was still 
wedded to the allure of the powerful, transformative figure, yet the reliance here on the force of “new 
shocks”, of revolutionary activity likened electrical charges, is, as we will see, something that will recur in a 
much later iteration. 
 By the 1840s, and Emerson’s increasing rhetorical and textual engagement with the politics of 
abolition, there is a marked shift in focus. His first anti-slavery speech, an “Address on the Emancipation 
of the Negroes in the British West Indies”, delivered at the Concord courthouse on August 1 1844, sets 
out a very precise understanding of the kind of revolutionary impulse that had resulted in the abolition of 
West Indian slavery. He declares that William Wilberforce’s introduction of a parliamentary bill in April 
1791 to outlaw the slave trade provoked an eruption of affective force, “a moral revolution” through 
which “the nation was aroused to enthusiasm”. But instead of such collective feeling regarded as a spur to 
positive political action, Emerson’s revolutionary transformation is defined instead through acts of 
renunciation: “In 1791, three hundred thousand persons in Britain pledged themselves to abstain from all 
articles of island produce” (CWE 11:109). Indeed, Britain’s moral character is not defined through 
Carlylean heroism but by rejection of the heroic act itself: 
 
Here was no prodigy, no fabulous hero, no Trojan horse, no bloody war, but all was achieved by 
plain means of plain men, working not under a leader, but under a sentiment. Other revolutions 
have been the insurrection of the oppressed; this was the repentance of the tyrant. It was the 
masters revolting from their mastery. The slave-holder said, “I will not hold slaves.” The end was 
noble and the means were pure. (CWE 11:135) 
 
Abolitionist feeling in Britain, Emerson suggests, is determined by the rejection of an idea of singular 
leadership as the source for generating political action. Instead, the “plain means of plain men” produce a 
revolution achieved not through conflict between slaveholders and the enslaved, but through an act of 
internal moral transformation. The phrase “under a sentiment” reveals the trigger for change, and points 
to the realm in which change occurs. As Martha Schoolman has pointed out, “As a historical description 
… it verges on the illegible”, for the abolition of slavery in the West Indies was not achieved simply 
through a collective act of slaveholder renunciation, but in the face of concerted resistance.29 Emerson’s 
focus, though, remains firmly on the revolutions of sympathy experienced by slaveholders and British 
public alike, for whom “[c]onscience rolled on its pillow, and could not sleep” (CWE 11:103). The 
democratic ideal is renovated by public opinion, such that revolution can entail a return to a condition of 
restored newness, prior to the immoral accretions of a slaveholding polity. Michael North’s study of the 
genealogy of revolution is useful here, with for its reminder that, as early as St. Augustine, revolutio meant 
“the same kind of providential return otherwise designated as reformatio or renascita”. The renovation 
brought about by abolition “returns a system to its starting point not to regain the old but to revive the 
new”.30          
Revolution, for Emerson, is neither defined by nor excludes the work of political change that 
might overturn a government or initiate the constitution of a new one. Reading across his writing it is 
apparent that revolution can occur in every aspect of human life: in “Self-Reliance” he asserts that “It is 
easy to see that a greater self-reliance must work a revolution in all the offices and relations of men; in 
their religion; in their education; in their pursuits; their modes of living; their association; in their 
property; in their speculative views” (CWE 2:77). Elsewhere, in “History”, Emerson would offer a model 
of revolutionary change, in which “private experience flashes a light” on the actions of collective bodies, 
so that “the crises of [an individual] life refer to national crises”: “Every revolution was first a thought in 
one man’s mind, and when the same thought occurs to another man, it is the key to that era” (CWE 2:5). 
The flashes of light are moments of transformation, or at least they signal the potential for it, and it is the 
transmission of these pulses, the transition that they inaugurate from one state to another, that generates 
the inevitability of revolution. Jonathan Levin notes that “a moment of transition may ultimately have 
what will eventually come to be defined as politically progressive consequences, but as it unfolds it 
remains undetermined in ways obscured by such retrospective characterizations”.31 In other words, the 
effects of Emerson’s revolutionary force might not be immediately apparent as politics, but its potential to 
be such, or to be read as such, is everywhere. In “The Divinity School Address” he declares that 
“Wherever a man comes, there comes revolution” (CWE 1:144), and it requires the cultivation of an 
ability to recognise and channel those transitionary shifts to bring this about. The “revolution” that “Self-
Reliance” predicts is a call for lives that manifest self-direction and moral fearlessness. As Mark Button 
has recently noted, Emerson “pushed relentlessly for a life lived from the inside out, for himself and 
others”,32 with the aim of encouraging a process of self-generation that would transform our conception 
of how democratic society might function as well as our place in it. To be sure, Emerson’s privileging of 
an inviolable, revolutionary self against a culture of conformity might present problems when one tries to 
map it on to any planned political programme. Yet his understanding of the relationship between thought 
and action is structured around an idiom and lexicon of “surprise” – “Life is a series of surprises” (CWE 
3:67), as “Experience” reminds us, a process of continual reinvention that makes available the possibility 
of wider transformation. 
A relatively neglected Emerson text, initially from the Civil War period, “Resources”, allows us to 
see most clearly how he envisages the singularly affective quality of the energies that might bring about 
revolution. As the editors of the Later Lectures note, “Resources” has a complicated textual genealogy. It 
began life as a lecture in 1864 as part of Emerson’s series on American Life; subsequently he delivered a 
version of it with regularity until 1872, as well as cannibalising it for other lectures during this period. It is 
clear from the frequency of its appearance in Emerson’s repertoire that, of the later lectures, “Resources” 
was one of his most popular pieces.33 And one can see why. Its celebration of America’s potential for 
energetic transformation, a paean to the adaptability of the nation and its settlers to create a world of 
exceptionalist promise (“The world is all gates, - all opportunities, - strings of tension waiting to be 
struck”), conforms to the most romantic, optative strains in Emerson’s writing. The country’s energies are 
generated by, and perpetuate, a fantasy of benevolent capitalism, in which the United States presents itself 
as a resource through which its citizens have the opportunity to express their “potences” (340). Indeed 
the lecture returns often to ideas of power and energy, to the harnessing of these forces in the 
refashioning of character and nation. “Life is always rapid here”, Emerson declares (343), with “American 
energy…overriding every venerable rule of political economy”. 
America is “a magazine of power”, a country in which “[t]he creation of power had never any 
parallel” (344). “The world belongs to the energetic man”, whose “will gives him new eyes” (348). The 
Civil War is described as “the most healthful revolution in the politics of the nation” (344), and Emerson 
assures his listeners that “the resources of America and its future will be immense…to wise and virtuous 
men” (354). The lecture nevertheless adds a note of caution by suggesting that the control of such energy 
needs to be carefully managed in the service of its wider potential. Power “speedily arrives at its limits, 
and requires to be husbanded” (350), so that the transition from one charged impulse to the next can be 
controlled. Dominic Mastroianni’s reading of this passage is helpful, for he suggests that “[t]he means of 
conducting power is a sort of secret spring…without which Emersonian citizenship would be 
unthinkable”.34 Putting ourselves in a position to channel this power – “If we knew how to draw the 
electricity!”, Emerson opines – would make available the “divine energies”35 for radical change. In an 
untitled lecture delivered in November 1860, which Bosco and Myerson call “Reform”, Emerson makes 
this connection explicit: “the force of moments”, singular instances of inspiration, “revolutionizes a long 
life of plausibilities; and these dangerous moments cannot be guarded against” (155). 
 
 
Martí’s revolutionary reconstructions  
 
In 1882, while living in New York, José Martí was asked to compose a “Prologue” to “Poem of Niagara” 
by the Venezuelan writer Juan Antonio Pérez Bonalde. Long a source of poetic inspiration as a model for 
the American sublime, the Falls themselves barely feature in Martí’s introduction. Instead he uses the 
opportunity afforded him to construct an elaborate response to Anglo-American modernity, in terms that 
are reminiscent of Emersonian preoccupations. The certainties of earlier eras are no more, he asserts, 
with doubt and uncertainty personified as a spectre haunting every house: 
An immense, pale man, dressed in black, with gaunt face, weeping eyes, and dry lips, is walking 
gravely across the earth without rest or sleep – and he has taken a seat in every home and has put 
his trembling hand on every bedstead. Such a pounding in the brain! Such fear in the breast! Such 
demanding of things that do not come! Such unawareness of what one wants! And in the spirit, 
such a sense of mingled nausea and delight: nausea for the day that is dying, delight for the 
dawn!36 
This striking image of incursion, with its accumulation of apostrophes, culminates in a turn towards, if 
not redemption, then reorientation, a revolution in how ideas are experienced and transmitted. The 
edifices of previous thought, solid, stable, inflexible, must now give way to a new intellectual arena, in 
which modalities of change and mobility are central. “All is expansion, communication, florescence, 
contagion, diffusion”, Martí asserts. Instead of thought resting in complacent stasis, everywhere 
confirmed in its legitimacy, ideas are charged with energy – “They go at a gallop, mounted on lightning, 
winged” (46),37 in an echo of Emerson. Indeed Emerson’s emphasis on thought as “vehicular and 
transitive” (CWE 3:34) finds a later, more uncertain iteration in Martí’s sense that “Ideas are lost in each 
other in the sea of our minds, as when a stone strikes blue water and the circles in the water lose 
themselves in each other”. The central conceit of Emerson’s essay “Circles” is here reimagined into 
something precious, beautiful in its fragility: “[T]hey dissolve into glowing sparks; they crumble. And 
hence the small, shimmering works of our time”.38 
As Aníbal González has observed, the prologue offers “a poetics comcerned not with 
technicalities of verse and form… but with the philosophical basis for a new literature”, one that must 
struggle against conformity and convention.39 At the heart of this project is a very Emersonian idea of 
revolution, one in which “literary originality” and “political freedom” become synonymous. “Man’s first 
task is to reconquer himself”, Martí writes. “[M]en [need to] be returned to themselves”, for “It is up to 
each man to reconstruct life, and no sooner does he look inside himself than he reconstructs it”.40 
Reconquering, returning, reconstructing – all active verbs indicative not of a nostalgic coming back, but 
instead of starting again differently. Martí looks to Emerson as providing a model of aversion to rigid 
thought, as making available thought as a political act. In turn, Martí’s politics, as these are revealed in his 
role as observer of the United States, are resistant to easy definition. They perform “a chameleonic 
construction that remains largely inimical to positivistic analysis”, as Paul Giles has noted, in which “a 
dynamic structural contradiction” intimates “how every situation and social organization could be looked 
at from a different point of view”.41 If for Emerson “[a] foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little 
minds, adored by little statesmen and philosophers and divines” (CWE 2:57), Martí’s own engagement 
with the United States, and with Emerson in particular, shares an unwillingness to settle easily into 
positions of reductive political judgement. 
Martí’s lengthy 1882 eulogy for Emerson, published in the Caracas-based La Opinión Nacional, 
shortly after the Concord philosopher’s death, is his most extended engagement with its subject. Anne 
Fountain’s research has uncovered the range of references, allusions, and paraphrases that Martí deploys 
to inhabit Emerson’s poetics and politics.42 My interest here lies not in revisiting this useful detective 
work, but rather in drawing attention to the ways in which Martí offers a reading of Emerson that pays 
careful attention to mobility of his thought. More widely, Martí resists conforming to the kinds of 
theoretically politicised accounts that seek to locate his postcolonial credentials in opposition to 
Emerson’s apparent imperialist ones. “His books are compendiums, not demonstrations”, Martí 
declares,43 an astute observation that describes a textual space in which the deliberate flaunting of 
programmatic, discursive logic is practised: “He followed no system, for that struck him as the act of a 
blind man or a servant; he believed in no system, for that struck him as the act of a weak, low, and 
envious mind” (119).44 “[A]t times”, Martí writes, “he seems to leap from one thing to another and at first 
the relationship between two adjacent ideas remains unclear”.45 Preferable to the rigidities of causal 
structure. Martí insists on the animated movement of Emerson’s self and text, his life “an endless soaring 
through the heights” (120),46 his writing “stimulates, arouses, inflames, and is like a gust of wind on a 
covered fire”. Emerson, in his persona and in his work, generates an energy that, for Martí, makes 
available the possibility of revolutionary transformation, one that “leaves the flames exposed to the air” 
(121).47        
Henry James’s encounter with a US leisure class in Florida, with which I began this essay, 
indexed his sensitivity both to the brash commercialism of tourist spaces and to their haunting by traces 
of an Hispanic past. As I have suggested, such a palimpsest signals James’s acquiescence to excess, the 
“residuum” that disrupts hermeneutic coherence. In José Martí’s 1881 chronicle of Coney Island, another 
location for Americans at play, excess is marked from the outset. “Nothing in the history of mankind”, 
Martí begins, “has ever equalled the marvelous prosperity of the United States”.48 In a Whitmanian 
cataloguing of the scene, formally reproducing Martí’s sense of the US’s insatiable culture of 
consumption, the sheer dynamism of a constantly formulating and reformulating culture amazes him: 
 
The surprising thing there is the size, the quantity, the sudden outburst of human activity, that 
immense valve of pleasure open to an immense people, … that mobility, that change of form, 
that fighting spirit, … that swelling tide, that dumbfounding, overwhelming, steady, frenzied 
expansiveness, and that simplicity in the marvellous; that is the surprising thing. (168)49           
 
The self in transition that, for Emerson, enacts the potential for revolutionary change, is here scaled up to 
an entire culture, one in which unpredictable divergences and intensities both challenge and entice Martí’s 
recording eye. Yet he is also careful to remind his readers that behind, below or aslant from this vision of 
capitalist energy lie alternative presences: “children’s cadaverous faces” suffering from cholera (167);50 
and Black minstrelsy put on for the entertainment of white America (“a poor Negro who, for a miserable 
wage, sticks his head out of a hole in a cloth and is busied day and night eluding with grotesque 
movements the balls pitched at him”  [169-70]).51 These are the ghosts of Anglo-American modernity, 
barely visible or ignored identities registering a troubling sense of disaffection from Coney Island’s 
consumerist spectacle. In a key paragraph Martí claims Emerson’s romantic energies for himself – and for 
Latin America – as a marker of cultural and political resistance. Instead of the seductions of Coney Island 
capital, he proposes a transcendental revolution pitched in the vocabulary of transition and 
transformation: 
Other peoples – we among them – live devoured by a sublime inner demon who pushes us 
tirelessly on in search of an ideal of love or glory. When we hold the measure of the ideal we 
were after, delighted as though we were holding an eagle, a new quest makes us restless, a new 
ambition spurs us, a new aspiration heads us toward a new vehement desire, and out of the 
captive eagle emerges a rebel, free butterfly, daring us to follow it, chaining us to her circuitous 
flight. (168)52 
The ideal ambiguously embodied in the symbol of the caged eagle (the bird, of course, the emblem of the 
United States) finds itself supplanted by further energies of political desire in which freedom and 
rebelliousness are the enticing principles now in play. The “circuitous flight” of the butterfly, reminiscent 
again perhaps of Emerson’s “Circles” essay, compels us to new possibilities of emancipation, to an 
enactment of Emerson’s striving for a “new yet unapproachable America” (CWE 3:72). 
It is curious, then, that the very clear affinity – rhetorical and intellectual – that Martí feels for 
Emerson has been the subject of a rigorous postcolonial reading that seeks both to expose Emerson’s 
retrograde politics, through a methodology of ideological critique, and to argue for Martí’s increasing 
distance from him (and them) as his own political agenda took shape. This discursive flattening of both 
writers negates the restless, curious nature of their prose in the interests of theoretical framing. Emerson 
remains for Martí a figure who represents an inextricably conjoined aesthetic and political sense of 
possibility. Transcendentalism’s rejection of forms of inherited European thinking and its constellation as 
a Victorian American avant-garde keen to reorient New World culture and politics appealed to Martí; his 
project for an independent and progressive Latin American political and cultural imaginary explicitly 
refuted Europe as the progenitor of value, celebrating instead “those who spring from Nature strong and 
genuine, active and solitary”.53 Martí allows his writing to follow different, sometimes contradictory, 
discursive pathways, such that what Jeffrey Lawrence has characterised as the “two versions of the 
relationship between the United States and Spanish-speaking America” at the end of the nineteenth 
century, namely “the hemispheric liberal republican emphasis on shared cultural values and the pan-
Latinist insistence on deep-seated and irreconcilable cultural traditions”. These co-exist across and within 
Martí’s prose, generating a prismatic perspective in which celebration and critique can co-exist.54 
Reading for ideological critique has tended to downplay the often experimental shape of 
Emerson’s and Martí’s prose, so that an approach that chooses to regard Emerson as a figure complicit in 
retrograde US politics and Martí as a reader able to see through such complicity overlooks the degree to 
which both writers imagine similar possibilities of resistance. The canonisation of Martí as a hero of 
Cuban independence and scourge of North American imperialism is central to George Lipsitz’s 
articulation of his continuing availability in the fight against US political and economic dominance under 
the guise of hemispheric agreements and treaties, with their attendant “cultural uniformity and univocality 
engendered by the pervasive growth of mass-media monopolies, market-driven education, and neo-
conservative cultural repression”.55 While Martí’s anti-colonialism is indeed strongly articulated in much 
of his writing, for all that an important text like “Our America” advocates Latin American solidarity in the 
face of US hegemony, his relationship to the country in which he was exiled for so many years is more 
complex and prismatic than a straightforward narrative of political resistance would suggest. His 
declaration in an 1882 letter to the editor of the Buenos Aires newspaper La Nación that “As for me, I 
contribute nothing more than my love for expansion – and my horror at the incarceration of the human 
spirit” points to both Martí’s political and rhetorical strategies.56 The materiality of injustice often finds its 
strongest opposition in the language of mobility and transcendence, in what Paul Giles has called “a 
triumph of the imagination, an emancipation of the spirit … [a] sense of hybridity and counterbalance”.57 
The aspiration to Emersonian flights, with its accompanying celebration of natural man in the face of an 
instrumental culture, is held in creative tension with an admission that, as an exile in the US, “There is 
something of the ship in every house in a foreign land. A certain sensation of indefinable unease persists. 
We feel the earth oscillating, and our feet are unsteady upon it. At times, we clutch the walls – and where 
others find solid footing, we lurch. The spirit is off balance”.58 With its echoes of Emerson’s scepticism in 
his essay “Experience” (“Where do we find ourselves?”), Martí’s hermeneutical strategies, like Emerson’s, 
revolve around patterns of attraction and alienation, moving between the two as the United States is 
encountered in all its unrealised potential.* 
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